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financial position, unable to attract capital or maintain their finan-
cial integrity. The utility pointed to certain indicia as evidence of
this contention, including the fact that the company had had to bor-
row money in order to pay dividends.89 The court countered this
argument with the observation that borrowing money is a routine
business transaction undertaken in order to raise capital to meet
various costs, including not only the payment of dividends, but
wages and other expenses as well. 0 Pointing out that Gulf States
still enjoyed an AA bond rating and that the company would earn a
13.84% return on equity without the rate increase, the court
dismissed the end result argument." Although the court's assess-
ment of the situation in the instant case may be correct, it is submit-
ted that continued refusal to allow earnings, on CWIP will bring
about the financial crisis Gulf States portrayed.
The United States has for several years been experiencing an
economy of inflationary spirals and a dwindling of energy resources,
and there are no indications that either of these trends will reverse
in the foreseeable future. Unlike free enterprises, regulated in-
dustries are unable to respond naturally to the laws of supply and
demand in order to weather the storm. Their economic viability
rests with the regulatory agencies; a faithful discharge of the agen-
cies duties requires realistic recognition of these trends. Once
adopted, this realistic viewpoint will surely entail a reassessment of
the traditional treatment of CWIP.
James Winston Pierce, Jr.
ABROGATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION- THE
ADVENT OF VOLUNTARY, RACE-DEPENDENT, PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,' the Gramercy,
Louisiana plant of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation insti-
69. 364 So. 2d at 1272.
70. Id. at 1273.
71. Id.
1. Effective on February 1, 1974, the master collective bargaining agreement
entered into by the United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation included an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalances then present in Kaiser's almost exclusively white craft work forces.
The plan removed the requirement of prior craft experience for on-the-job training and
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tuted an in-plant craft training program. During the first year of the
agreement's operation, seven black and six white employees were
selected for the program. The most junior black trainee selected had
less seniority than several white production workers whose applica-
tions for admission were rejected. Brian Weber, one of the rejected
white workers, instituted a class action suit in federal district court,'
alleging that because the affirmative action' program of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement had resulted in junior black workers re-
ceiving craft training in preference to more senior white employees,
he and other similarly situated white employees had been
discriminated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' Affirming the district court judgment,5 the Court of Ap-
established an entrance ratio of one minority worker to one white worker until the
percentage of minority craft workers approximated the percentage of minority popula-
tion in the local work force. Eligibility for training continued to be determined by
plant seniority, but to implement the affirmative action goal it was necessary to estab-
lish dual seniority lists: for each two training vacancies, one white and one black
worker would be selected on the basis of seniority within their respective racial
groups. The pertinent portions of the collective bargaining agreement provide:
"It is further agreed that the Joint Committee will specifically review the minor-
ity representation in the existing Trade, Craft and Assigned Maintenance classifi-
cations, in the plants set forth below, and, where necessary, establish certain
goals and time tables in order to achieve a desired minority ratio:" [Kaiser's
Gramercy, Louisiana plant was listed, among others] "As apprentice and craft
jobs are to be filled, the contractual selection criteria shall be applied in reaching
such goals; at a minimum, not less than one minority employee will enter for
every non-minority employee entering until the goal is reached unless at a par-
ticular time there are insufficient available qualified minority candidates .... "
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 763 (E.D. La. 1976).
2. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
3. The Kaiser-United Steelworkers affirmative action plan was neither a court-
imposed plan nor was it developed as part of a consent decree after an administrative
investigation. The plan was adopted to avoid future litigation and to comply with the
requirements of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs under Executive Or-
der 11246, which requires all applicants for federal contracts to refrain from employment
discrimination and to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, col-
or, religion, sex or national origin .... " 3 C.F.R. § 202(1) (1974), reprinted at 42 U.S.C.
app. § 2000e (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a) (1976), provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
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peals for the Fifth Circuit held that all racially-based employment
preferences, absent prior hiring or promotion discrimination, in-
cluding preferences incidental to affirmative action programs,
violate the prohibition of Title VII against racial discrimination in
employment.' The United States Supreme Court reversed and held
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which expressly pro-
hibits discrimination "because .. .of race"7 in hiring and admission
to on-the-job training programs, does not condemn all private, volun-
tary, race-conscious affirmative action plans. United Steelworkers of.
America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721 (1979).
The concepts of affirmative action and reverse discrimination'
Section 703(d) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(d) (1976), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization,
or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training
or retraining, including on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission
to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
5. The district court held that the affirmative action quota system violated sec-
tions 703(a) and (d) of Title VII, entered judgment for the plaintiff class, and granted
an injunction. Furthermore, the district court concluded that since the black employees
being preferred over more senior white employees had never themselves been the sub-
ject of any unlawful discrimination during hiring, they occupied their "rightful place"
in the plant. Thus, the affirmative action quota system was inappropriate and violated
the unequivocal prohibitions against raciar discrimination against any individual con-
tained in sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 415 F.
Supp. at 769. For a full discussion of the "rightful place" and "freedom now" doctrines
as they relate to fictional seniority, see United States v. Local 189, United Paper-
makers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
6. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &.,Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977). The
fifth circuit held that the evidence was insufficient to show that Kaiser had been guilty
of any prior hiring or promotion discrimination and, absent such past discrimination,
the affirmative action quota system implemented by Kaiser and the Steelworkers
union violated sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at
224. Furthermore, the court of appeals concluded that if Executive Order 11246 man-
dates a racial quota for admission to the Kaiser training program, then the Executive
Order must fall before the direct congressional prohibition embodied in the explicit
language of section 703(d), which specifically prohibits racial classification in admission
to on-the-job training programs. Id. at 226. The decision of the fifth circuit ultimately
rested upon what it viewed to be a proper distinction between permissible affirmative
action and unlawful reverse discrimination. Id. at 219. See generally Note, The Use of
Racial Preferences in Employment: The Affirmative Action/Reverse Discrimination
Dilemma, 32 VAND. L. REV. 783 (1979).
7. See note 4, supra.
8. See generally Ely,'The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Husak, Preferential Hiring and Reverse Discrimination in
Favor of Blacks: A Moral Analysis, 23 AM. J. JUsIs. 143 (1978). As in the instant case,
the argument in the past against "reverse discrimination" has been that Title VII pro-
hibits such racial preferences for minorities because those preferences discriminate
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can be viewed as outgrowths of the constitutional and statutory
principle of nondiscrimination.' Since the Reconstruction amend-
ments were enacted after the Civil War, the nation has been com-
mitted by constitutional mandate to the principle of nondiscrimina-
tion. The fifteenth amendment expressly reflects this principle,"°
and, with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress
extended the principle of nondiscrimination into the thirteenth
amendment." The fourteenth amendment guarantees that no state
shall deny any citizen equal protection of the laws.12 Reaching
beyond its initial interpretation that the fourteenth amendment pro-
tected only blacks, 3 the Supreme Court has expansively construed 4
against whites on the grounds of race. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534
F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) (court-imposed quotas altering
seniority system held to be unlawful reverse discrimination).
9. Nondiscrimination is a principle of generally disapproving practices and classi-
fications that are race-dependent. See Note, supra note 6, 787. A proper distinction
between permissible affirmative action and unlawful reverse discrimination has persis-
tently resisted clear delineation due to the interaction of the concepts. A charge of
reverse discrimination emerges only in reaction to some antecedent affirmative action
which results in a race-dependent preference in favor of a minority. Id. For a discus-
sion of decisions and practices that depend on the race of the parties affected, see
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1976).
10. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
11. Ratified in 1865 to abolish slavery, the thirteenth amendment encountered
postbellum Southern resistance in the form of state statutes which deprived the freed
slaves of their legal and civil rights. Pursuant to section 2 of the amendment (which
gave Congress the power to enforce the guarantees of the amendment by "appropriate"
legislation), Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)). Since the constitutionality of the Act was
in doubt, and to insulate it from repeal, Congress enacted the fourteenth amendment which
was ratified in 1868. See Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1329 (1952). The enforcement power to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment enabled Congress in 1870 to re-enact in toto the 1866 Act. Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144. See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse,
1968 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 123. See also Note, Federal Power to Regulat Private Discrimina-
tion: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the ReconstructionEra Amendments, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 449, 452 (1974). The decision of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968), is indicative of how the principle of racial nondiscrimination has been ex-
tended into the thirteenth amendment by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The Jones
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a codified version of the 1866 Act, "bars all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and ... is a
valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment." 392
U.S. at 413 (emphasis in original).
12. The equal protection clause provides: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
14. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
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the language of the equal protection clause, holding that race-
dependent classifications are constitutionally suspect15 and require
strict scrutiny. The principle of nondiscrimination is also a core con-
cern of most state fair employment laws16 and federal civil rights
legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 As the funda-
mental federal law embodying the principle of nondiscrimination as
it applies to employment relationships, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer, employment agency,
or labor union to "discriminate against any individual" in hiring, pro-
motion, or other employment relationships for reasons of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."18
Proponents of affirmative action concepts have argued that the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 emphasizes con-
gressional concern with discrimination against minorities19 and con-
gressional intent to make available opportunities which traditionally
had been denied to minorities.20 It is argued that the language21 and
U.S. 535 (1942). See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.
L. REV. 1065 (1969); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword& In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949).
15. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954).
16. A majority of the states have enacted fair employment practice legislation.
Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Dakota do not have fair employ-
ment laws, For the text and citations of the laws, see 8A BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL 453:1 (1977). For a comprehensive
study of the coverages and exemptions provided by state fair employment laws, see
Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment Practices Legislation, (pt. 1)
61 Nw. U.L. REV. 907 (1967); (pt. 2) 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 19 (1967). See also P. NORGREN &
S. HILL, TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT (1964); M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 19-60 (1966).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). In Diaz v. Pan American Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), the fifth circuit stated that
"the purpose of the [Civil Rights Act of 1964] was to provide a foundation in the law
for the principle of nondiscrimination." See also Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1978)
("The principle of nondiscrimination requires that individuals be considered on the
basis of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally at-
tributed to the group.").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
19. See 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
20. See, e.g., Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 952-54 (1978); Brest,
supra note 9, at 31-43; Deutsch, The Jurisprudence of Affirmative Action. A Post-
Realist Analysis, 65 GEO. L.J. 879, 880 (1977); Ely, supra note 8.
21. Title VII provides that "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and per-




legislative history of Title VII provide evidence that Congress in-
tended to create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary compliance"
with the national policy of nondiscrimination as a primary requisite
to the success of the legislation.23 However, the Supreme Court in
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,24 interpreted Title
VII as mandating color-blind"6 decisions and concluded that it makes
unlawful any plan that creates a race-dependent preference except
as a make-whole remedy ' for victims of a particular employer's past
discrimination. Such a construction of Title VII-that remedial use
of quotas is lawful-has led to charges of reverse discrimination.27
But the Supreme Court has rejected attacks on affirmative action
22. The House Report accompanying the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicates that
Congress did not intend to forbid all forms of private, voluntary affirmative action.
The Report provides:
No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the causes and consequences of
racial and other types of discrimination. There is reason to believe, however, that
national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with
the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary
or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963).
23. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander,
the Supreme Court described the legislative history of Title VII as follows:
Congress enacted Title VII ... to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. .... Cooperation and voluntary compliance
were selected as the preferred means for achieving this goal .... In the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ... Congress amended Title VII to provide
the Commission with further authority to investigate individual charges of dis-
crimination, to promote voluntary compliance with the requirements of Title VII,
and to institute civil actions against employers or unions named in a discrimina-
tion charge.
Id. at 44.
24. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
25. In affirming a general principle of color-blindness, the Supreme Court held
that the 1866 and 1964 civil rights acts protect white as well as black employees
against racially discriminatory disciplinary discharges. Id. at 280 & 287. Noting that it
was not determining the permissibility of an affirmative action program, the Court
stated: "Santa Fe disclaims that the actions challenged here were any part of affir-
mative action program .... and we emphasize that we do not consider here the per-
missibility of such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise prompted." Id.
at 281 n.8.
26. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1976). See also
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-21 (1975).
27. See generally N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); REVERSE DISCRIMINATION (B. Gross ed. 1977); Kaplan, Equal
Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro- The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363, 367-88 (1966).
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plans when the programs creating race-dependent preferences were
judicially imposed 8 or approved in consent decrees.'
Interpretation of Title VII has created additional discord be-
cause of the seemingly contradictory provisions of section 703(j),3°
which states that employers are not to be required to give race-
dependent, preferential treatment on account of a de facto racial im-
balance in the employer's work force, and section 706(g),"1 which
vests in the courts broad remedial powers to order equitable relief
for substantive violations. While court-imposed affirmative action
quota relief had been upheld on the grounds that section 703(j) does
not apply once prior discrimination is found,"2 until the Weber
decision it was uncertain whether voluntary, race-conscious affirma-
tive action plans were permissible.3
In considering the question of whether Title VII permits em-
ployers and unions in the private sector to voluntarily take race-
dependent steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories, the Supreme Court in Weber
held that Title VII does not prohibit such race-dependent affirma-
28. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The lower courts have
not hesitated to impose remedial affirmative action quotas. See, e.g., Rios v. Enter-
prise Assoc. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491
F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
29. A consent decree involves no proof of prior discrimination as a prerequisite
for affirmative action. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978). Consent decrees generally assume the form of an
agreement by the defendant to cease the activities asserted to be illegal by the
government. Upon court approval of such an agreement, the government's action
against the defendant is dropped. A consent decree binds only the consenting parties
and is not binding upon the court. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 370 (5th ed. 1979).
30. Section 703(j) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of the race ... of such individual or group on ac-
count of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of any race ... employed by any employer, . . .or in the available
work force ....
31. Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), provides: "If the court
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in
an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affir-
mative action as may be appropriate."
32. See, e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976); Rios v. Enterprise Assoc. Steamfitters Local
638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
33. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
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tive action programs.' Furthermore, while noting that the express
language of sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII makes it unlawful to
"discriminate ... because of... race" 5 in hiring and in the selection
of apprentices for training programs," the Court held that the pro-
hibition in sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII against racial discrimi-
nation does not condemti all private, voluntary, race-conscious affir-
mative action programs."
At the outset of the majority opinion written by Justice Brennan,8
the Weber Court emphasized the narrowness of its inquiry. Since
no state action was involved in the 1974 collective bargaining
agreement, the case did not present an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution." Furthermore, the private,
voluntary nature of the affirmative action plan enabled the Court to
restrict the scope of its inquiry.'1 Thus, the Court expressly stated
that it was not concerned with what Title VII requires or with what
relief a court might impose to remedy a past violation of Title VII.'2
The only question the Court addressed was the limited statutory
issue of whether Title VII forbids private employers and unions
from voluntarily adopting affirmative action programs that accord
race-dependent preferences.3
Express statutory language of sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII
34. Id. at 2725.
35. See note 4, supra.
36. 99 S. Ct. at 2726.
37. Id. at 2730.
38. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun
to form the majority. Justice Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion. Chief Jus-
tice Burger filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion
in which the Chief Justice joined. Justices Powell and Stevens did not participate in
the consideration or decision of the case.
39. 99 S. Ct. at 2726.
40. The lack of an alleged violation of the equal protection clause enabled the
Weber Court to base its decision on statutory interpretation of Title VII. In Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun opined that voluntary, race-dependent preferences as remedial
actions are not violative of the equal protection clause. Justice Powell asserted that
the preferential treatment in that case was a violation of equal protection. Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist did
not reach the equal protection issue because of their finding that Title VI was violated.
This four-four-one decision left many reverse discrimination questions unanswered, but
did foreshadow the Court's decision in Weber. Although Bakke was not a Title VII ac-
tion, in their concurring opinion, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun ex-
pressed the view that voluntary, race-dependent preferences as remedial actions do
not violate Title VII. Id. at 352-55.





makes it unlawful to "discriminate ... because of ... race" in hiring
and in the selection of apprentices for training programs." To over-
come this literal manifestation of congressional intent embodied in
the plain language45 of Title VII, the Court declared that "[t]he pro-
hibition against racial discrimination in §§ 703(a) and (d) of Title VII
must therefore be read against the background of the legislative
history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act
arose."
46
The historical context 7 giving rise to the enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompassed a complex of motives,48
chief among which was doubtless a desire to enhance the relative
social and economic position of American blacks. 49 Few contempo-
rary domestic problems have received more scholarly attention °
44. See note 4, supra.
45. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a statute, the function of a court is to ascer-
tain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. One way in which the courts have
dealt with the intention of the legislature has been to apply the "plain meaning rule,"
which has as its essential aspect a denial of the need to "interpret" unambiguous
language. Applying this "rule" in United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 278
U.S. 269, 278 (1929), the Court asserted that "where the language of an enactment is
clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the mean-
ing intended." In an earlier decision the Court had stated:
If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, and it is neither the duty nor
the privilege of the courts to enter speculative fields in search of a different
meaning. . . . [Wihen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final
expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from
by considerations drawn . . . from any extraneous source.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). For a discussion of the application
of this rule by modern courts, see Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-Mean-
ing Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1299 (1975). But see Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the In-
terpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 2727. To support its method of statutory interpretation, the Court
relied on the statement that "[i]t is a 'familiar rule that a thing may be within the let-
ter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor
within the intention of its makers."' Id, quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
47. For an interesting discussion of the historical context from which Title VII
arose, see Schlei, Foreword to B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW vii (1976).
48. President Kennedy thought the legislation was needed to stem "a rising tide
of discontent that threatens the public safety." 109 CONG. REC. 11,174 (1963).
49. See Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1971).
50. See, e.g., 0. ASHENFELTER & A. REES, DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR MARKETS
(1973); J. FRANKLIN & I. STARR, THE NEGRO IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1967); H.
NORTHRUP & R. ROWAN, THE NEGRO AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (1965); A. Ross &
H. HILL, EMPLOYMENT, RACE, AND POVERTY (1967).
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than the depressed economic status of black Americans." Accord-
ingly, there is no reason to dispute the Weber Court's conclusion
that the primary concern of Congress in enacting the prohibition
against racial discrimination in Title VII was "the plight of the
Negro in our economy."52 Although the assessment by the Weber
Court of the historical context surrounding the enactment of Title
VII is in accord with events of those days, the Court's interpretation
of the statute and its legislative history "seizes every thing from
which aid can be derived""3 to support its conclusion that an inter-
pretation of Title VII upholding Weber's claim would "bring about
an end completely at variance with the purpose of the statute."5"
The Court recognized the force" of Weber's argument that race-
dependent, affirmative action quotas are prohibited by the plain
language of sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VIP combined with the
McDonald holding that Title VII forbids discrimination against
whites as well as blacks. Since the challenged affirmative action
plan was voluntarily adopted by private parties and had as its pur-
pose the elimination of traditional patterns of racial segregation, the
Court concluded that Weber's reliance upon a literal construction of
sections 703(a) and (d) combined with the holding in McDonald was
misplaced. 8 To support such a conclusion in the face of clear and
unambiguous statutory language in Title VII, the Court relied upon
its interpretation of the statute59 and an extremely selective reading
of the legislative history of Title VII. Emphasizing that the "pur-
pose" of Title VII divined from seemingly newly discovered"0 legisla-
tive history should control over the extraordinary clarity of the
statutory language, the Court prefaced its "interpretation" of Title
VII by stating: "It is a 'familiar rule that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
51. See Note, supra note 49, at 1113.
52. 99 S. Ct. at 2727. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist agreed with the
majority that "the reality of employment discrimination against Negroes provided the
primary impetus for passage of Title VII." 99 S. Ct. at 2740 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
53. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
54. 99 S. Ct. at 2727.
55. Id. at 2726.
56. See note 4, supra.
57. See text at notes 24-26, supra.
58. 99 S. Ct. at 2726.
59. Id. at 2727.
60. In McDonald, the Court concluded from the "uncontradicted legislative
history" that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in
this case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes." 427
U.S. at 280.
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within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers."'"1 Under the
rubric of statutory interpretation, the Court radically reconstructs
Title VII, apparently to achieve what it regards as a proper result."
Investigation of the legislative history of Title VII to divine the
"purpose of the statute,""8 as the five Justices 4 of the Weber majori-
ty perceived it, prompted one of the five, Justice Blackmun, in his
concurring opinion to state that he shares "some of the misgivings
expressed in Mr. Justice R[ehnquist]'s dissent ... concerning the ex-
tent to which the legislative history of Title VII clearly supports the
result the Court reaches today.6 15 Such misgivings regarding the
61. 99 S. Ct. at 2727. The Supreme Court quoted from an 1892 opinion, Holy Trin-
ity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), as authority for this "rule." Ironically,
Holy Trinity Church has been discussed as an illustration of the application of the
"golden rule" of literalism in statutory construction. See Coffman, Essay on Statutory
Interpretation, 9 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 57, 65 (1978).
The Holy Trinity Church maxim cited by the Court was applied originally in a case
in which a disputed contract was found to be within the letter of the statute under
consideration. 143 U.S. at 458. However, the Holy Trinity Church Court construed the
statute as inapplicable in light of the result to which a literal application of the statute
would lead. Id. at 459.
62. For a discussion of result-oriented statutory interpretation, see Radin, Statu-
tory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). Professor Radin has suggested that
an interpretation of a statute should take into consideration only its results. A
desirable result will be "what satisfies the social emotions of the judge, what fits into
the ideal scheme of society which he entertains." Id. at 884.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 2727.
64. In Weber, Justice Stewart joined the four Justices who in their concurring
opinion in Bakke reasoned that findings of specific discrimination are not necessary as
long as the beneficiaries of the affirmative action are within a class of persons who
have suffered from discrimination in society at large. See 438 U.S. at 372-73. See note
40, supra.
65. 99 S. Ct. at 2730-31 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun stated that
"the passages marshaled by the dissent are not so compelling as to merit the whip
hand over the obvious equity of permitting employers to ameliorate the effects of past
discrimination for which Title VII provides no direct relief." Id. at 2734. However,
Justice Powell in Bakke had addressed the absence of jurisprudential support for the
fashioning of such remedies for societal discrimination by stating that the Court had
never approved such schemes for "persons perceived as members of relatively vic-
timized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." 438
U.S. at 307. Only after such findings have been made does the governmental interest
in preferring members of the injured group become substantial, "since the legal rights
of the victims must be vindicated." Id. Not only must the extent of the injury and the
consequent remedy require judicial, legislative, or administrative definition, but the
remedial action "usually remains subject to continuing oversight to assure that it will
work the least harm to other innocent persons competing for the benefit." Id. at 308.
Otherwise, the result would be "to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations
of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant
at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimina-
tion. This is a step we have never approved." Id. at 310.
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result reached by the Court are founded in a recognition of what ap-
pears to be the obvious-the Court need not have resorted to legis-
lative history to discover what is apparent from the face of the
statute."' Since sections 703(a) and (d) unambiguously and unequivo-
cally forbid employers from discriminating because of race in hiring
and in the selection of apprentices for training programs, 7 the
racially discriminatory, affirmative action quota at issue is flatly
prohibited by the plain language"8 of Title VII. However, this nor-
mally dispositive fact did not prevent the Court from deciding that
Title VII does not forbid private employers and unions from volun-
tarily agreeing upon bona fide affirmative action plans that accord
race-dependent preferences. 9 This result was achieved by resorting
to a questionable reading of legislative history and by focusing on
the use of only the word "require" rather than the words "require
or permit" in section 703(j)70 of Title VII.
While rejecting a literal construction of sections 703(a) and (d),
the Weber Court favored a version of legislative history which led it
to a conclusion diametrically opposed to that compelled by the "un-
contradicted legislative history"" developed in McDonald and other
prior decisions. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,7 2 the Court's first op-
portunity to interpret Title VII, a unanimous Court observed that
"[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain
66. See note 45, supra. In United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court
stated: "Having concluded that the provisions of [the section] are clear and unequivocal
on their face, we find no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act." Id. at 648
(emphasis added). In another case, Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945), the
Court, per Justice Rutledge, concluded: "The plain words and meaning of a statute
cannot be overcome by a legislative history which, through strained processes of
deduction from events of wholly ambiguous significance, may furnish dubious bases for
inference in every direction." Id. at 260. Justice Vinson, as organ of the Court in Ex
Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949), relied upon the Gemsco rule when he stated: "The
short answer is that there is no need to refer to the legislative history where the
statutory language is clear. . . . This canon of construction has received consistent
adherence in our decisions." Id at 61.
67. See note 4, supra.
68. See note 45, supra.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 2726.
70. See note 30, supra.
71. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 280. In his concurring
opinion in Weber, Justice Blackmun charged the dissent with "[failing] to take proper
account of our prior cases that have given that history a much more limited reading
than that adopted by the dissent." 99 S. Ct. at 2733 (Blackmun, J., concurring). While
the passages cited by Justice Blackmun from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
434-36 (1971), and International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 349-51 (1977), arguably support his limited reading of legislative history, these
same passages again demonstrate congressional concern for the principle of nondis-
crimination embodied in Title VII.
72. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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from the language of the statute"7 and furthermore, "[d]iscrimina-
tory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and
only what Congress has proscribed."" The statutory principle of
nondiscrimination was emphasized once more in Trans World Air-
lines, Inc. v. Hardison,"5 in which the Court stated that "[t]he em-
phasis of both the language and the legislative history of the statute
is on eliminating discrimination in employment; similarly situated
employees are not to be treated differently solely because they dif-
fer with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."7
The Court further added: "The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of
both the language and the legislative history of Title VII is on elimi-
nating discrimination in employment, and such discrimination is pro-
scribed when it is directed against majorities as well as minorities."77
Additionally, until Weber was decided, the Court's language in
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters" seemed dispositive of the
question raised by Weber. The Furnco Court stated that "[i]t is clear
beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide
an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without
regard to whether members of the applicant's race are already pro-
portionately represented in the work force."7 Thus, from an ex-
amination of pre-Weber jurisprudence it is evident that the
Supreme Court had been consistent in its interpretation that the
statutory language and legislative history of Title VII "prohibits all
discrimination in employment, without exception for any particular
employees.""0 Contrary to these prior statements, the Weber Court
concluded that the legislative history of Title VII indicating congres-
sional concern with minority employment frees employers to dis-
criminate on the basis of race to alleviate the effects of traditional
patterns of racial segregation which have resulted in manifest im-
balances in certain job categories.
As further support for its holding, the Court examined the
wording of section 703(j)"1 of Title VII and inferred that "Congress
chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action." 2
Section 703(j) provides that nothing contained in Title VII "shall be
interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential treat-
73. Id. at 429.
74. Id. at 431.
75. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
76. Id. at 71.
77. Id. at 81.
78. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
79. I& at 579 (emphasis in original).
80. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 283 (emphasis in original).
81. See note 30, supra.
82. 99 S. Ct. at 2729.
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ment ... to any group because of the race.., of such.., group on
account of""3 a de facto racial imbalance in the employer's work
force. From this language, the Court argued that section 703(j) con-
tains a "negative pregnant"' that allows employers to do what sec-
tions 703(a) and (d) expressly forbid employers from doing. The
Court declared that "[tlhe section does not state that 'nothing in Ti-
tle VII shall be interpreted to permit' voluntary affirmative efforts
to correct racial imbalances." 5 To the contrary, the Court concluded,
this word choice compels the inference that "Congress chose not to
forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action."8
Rather than adhering to the plain-meaning rule of statutory con-
struction, 7 the Weber Court consulted the legislative record and
concluded that the selection of the word "require" rather the words
"require or permit" was a result of a compromise between propo-
nents of Title VII and its opponents who traditionally resisted
federal regulation of private business. 8 The argument advanced by
the Court focused on portions of legislative history that revealed the
fears of the opponents of Title VII that section 703 would be inter-
preted in such a way as to interfere with management prerogatives
and union freedoms and lead to undue government interference with
private business decisions.8 Based upon this view of legislative his-
tory, the Court reasoned that "a prohibition against all voluntary,
race-conscious affirmative action efforts would . . . augment the
powers of the Federal Government and diminish traditional manage-
ment prerogatives."" Therefore, the conclusion drawn by the Court
was that the "use of the word 'require' rather than the words 're-
quire or permit' in § 703(j) fortifies the conclusion that Congress did
not intend to limit traditional freedom to such a degree as to pro-
hibit all voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action." 1
Instead of strengthening the argument for race-dependent
preferences, the shift in emphasis from the explicit prohibitions
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
84. See 99 S. Ct. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
85. 99 S. Ct. at 2729 (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. The plain meaning rule of statutory construction was reiterated by the Court
in a decision only nine days removed from the Weber decision. United States v.
Rutherford, 99 S. Ct. 2470 (1979). In Rutherford, the Court stated that "[w]hen con-
struing a statute so explicit in scope, a court must act within certain well-defined con-
straints. If a legislative purpose is expressed in 'plain and unambiguous language ...
[the] duty of the courts is to give it effect according to its terms."' Id. at 2475. See
note 45, supra.






against racial discrimination of sections 703(a) and (d) toward a focus
upon language not present in section 703(j) actually weakens the ma-
jority position." Section 703(j) was added to the bill which ultimately
became law to define and clarify the scope of Title VII's substantive
prohibitions." Unlike sections 703(a) and (d), section 703(j) is specifi-
cally directed at enforcement entities -federal agencies and courts
-charged with the responsibility of interpreting Title VII9  Oppo-
nents of the civil rights bill did not argue that Title VII would per-
mit voluntary, race-dependent preferential treatment by employers
to correct racial imbalance."5 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dis-
sent, "[tihe plain language of the statute too clearly prohibited such
racial discrimination to admit of any doubt."96 They argued,
however, that Title VII would be construed by enforcement
authorities to require employers to achieve a racial balance in their
work force by granting race-dependent preferential treatment. Sup-
porters of the civil rights bill responded that Title VII would not be
so interpreted because it does not permit preferential treatment of
any race. To quieten the opposition, section 703(j) was added to the
civil rights bill to enjoin the enforcement entities from construing
Title VII to require an employer to grant race-dependent preferen-
tial treatment to correct racial imbalances in his work force.
However, section 703(j) "says nothing about voluntary preferential
92. After a thorough examination of legislative history, Justice Rehnquist stated
that
[clontrary to the Court's analysis, the language of § 703(j) is precisely tailored to
the objection voiced time and again by Title VII's opponents. Not once during the
83 days of debate in the Senate did a speaker, proponent or opponent, suggest
that the bill would allow employers voluntarily to prefer racial minorities over
white persons.
99 S. Ct. at 2748 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
93. See H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Supporters of Title VII proposed
the carefully worded amendment to the bill to put to rest the opposition's charge that
Title VII would be applied by federal agencies in such a way that "some kind of quota
system will be used." 110 CONG. REC. 8619 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Sparkman).
94. Compare section 703(a) at note 4, supra ("It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer"), with section 703(j) at note 30, supra ("Nothing contained in
this subchapter shall be interpreted").
95. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 13,077 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 13,149
(remarks of Sen. Russell).
96. 99 S. Ct. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
97. Representative Lindsay noted that "this bill does not require quotas, racial
balance, or any of the things that the opponents have been saying about it." 110 CONG.
REC. 15,876 (1964). Moreover, Representative McCollugh emphasized this understand-
ing when he remarked that "[tihe bill does not permit the Federal Government to re-
quire an employer or union to hire or accept for membership a quota for persons from
a particular minority group." Id. at 15,893.
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treatment of minorities because such racial discrimination is plainly
proscribed by sections 703(a) and (d).""
Without defining in detail the line of demarcation between per-
missible and impermissible affirmative action plans, the Weber
Court held that the challenged affirmative action plan "falls on the
permissible side of the line."99 Several factors enabled the Court to
conclude that this plan "falls within the area of discretion left by
Title VII to the private sector.""1 0 The fact that the affirmative ac-
tion plan was "a temporary measure,"'0 1 which was "voluntarily
adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial
segregation," ' 2 was relied upon by the Court to uphold the chal-
lenged preferential treatment. Thus, three criteria emerge from the
approach used by the Weber Court to approve race-dependent
preferences: the affirmative action plan must be a temporary plan,
voluntarily adopted, and designed to end traditional segregation.
The Court's characterization of the plan 03 as a temporary mea-
sure""4 is misleading. Far from being a temporary measure, the plan,
as implemented, will require years of preferential selection of craft
trainees before the percentage of black skilled craft workers approx-
imates the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.0 5 Further-
more, the testimony of the industrial relations superintendent at the
Gramercy plant0" disputes the Weber Court's assertion that
98. 99 S. Ct. at 2752 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that had
Congress intended to except voluntary, race-dependent preferential treatment from
the explicit prohibition on racial discrimination in sections 703(a) and (d) it could have
so drafted with express language as it did in section 703(i):
"Nothing contained in [title VIII shall apply to any business or enterprise on or
near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly announced employment
practice of such business or enterprise under which a preferential treatment is
given to any individual because he is an Indian living on or near a reservation."
IL
99. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2726.
103. See note 1, supra, and accompanying text. The "Joint Committee" established
a goal of thirty-nine percent as the percentage of minorities that must be represented
in each "craft family" at the plant. 415 F. Supp. at 764.
104. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
105. As implemented, the Kaiser-United Steelworkers affirmative action plan will
require an estimated thirty years to achieve the goal of at least thirty-nine percent
minority representation in each craft family. Once the present goal is achieved, new
quotas are planned to perpetuate the program. Address by Michael R. Fontham, attor-
ney for Brian Weber, Phi Alpha Delta Chapter, Law Center, Louisiana State Universi-
ty (Oct. 3, 1979).
106. At trial, Dennis E. English, industrial relations superintendent at the Gramercy
plant, testified:
Once the goal is reached of 39 percent, or whatever the figure will be down the
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preferential selection of craft trainees at the Gramercy plant will
end as soon as the required percentages are achieved. 7
Since the instant affirmative action plan was adopted through
collective bargaining by the employer and the union," 8 the Court
deemed the plan to be "voluntary." However, the voluntary nature
of the plan is questionable 9 when the following facts underlying its
adoption are considered: the Office Of Federal Contracts Compli-
ance" ° was exerting pressure on Kaiser's Gramercy, Louisiana, plant
because of the small percentage.' of blacks among its skilled
workers, and Title VII actions had arisen at two other Kaiser plants
in Louisiana."' The question raised by the Weber Court, but not
decided, is that of what is "voluntary" affirmative action."'
Scant reasoning was put forward by the Court to support its
argument that because the challenged affirmative action plan was
designed to "eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally
segregated job categories""' the plan is not forbidden by Title VII.
road, I think it's subject to change, once the goal is reached in each of the craft
families, at that time, we will then revert to a ratio of what that percentage is, if
it remains at 39 percent and we attain 39 percent someday, we will then continue
placing trainees in the program at that percentage. The idea being to have a
minority representation in the plant that is equal to that representation in the
community work force population.
99 S. Ct. at 2738 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
107. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
108. Id. at 2724.
109. See 99 S. Ct. at 2749 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), subsequently renamed the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), is an administrative agency
of the Department of Labor which is responsible for ensuring compliance by govern-
ment contractors with the requirements of Executive Order 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319
(1965), as amended by Exec. Order 11375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967), and by Exec.
Order 12086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978). Executive Order 11246 requires all govern-
ment contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed,
and the employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." 3 C.F.R. § 202(1) (1974), reprinted at 42 U.S.C. app.
§ 2000e (1976).
Under Executive Order 11246, the Secretary of Labor is empowered to issue rules
and regulations necessary to achieve its purpose. The Secretary of Labor has dele-
gated most enforcement duties to the OFCCP. 563 F.2d at 218 n.3.
111. Prior to the 1974 Labor Agreement only 1.83% (5 out of 273) of the skilled
craft workers at the Gramercy plant were black. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
112. See the background facts of Weber listed by Stephen M. Booth, attorney for
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., in [19791 101 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 358-60.
113. It may be that an affirmative action plan adopted as a result of pressures from
the OFCCP is not converted into a non-voluntary plan. Furthermore, it remains to be
seen whether actions taken as a result of pressure from the EEOC or actions filed
under Title VII, such as consent decrees and conciliation agreements, are voluntary
within the meaning of Weber. Perhaps the only non-voluntary affirmative action plan
is a court-ordered one. See id. at 359.
114. 99 S. Ct. at 2725.
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As read by the Court, the legislative history demonstrated that "it
was clear to Congress that 'the crux of the problem [was] to open
employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have
been traditionally closed to them.' 1 ". Notwithstanding the principle
of nondiscrimination, the Court concluded that it was to the problem
of "manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job cate-
gories" ''1 that "Title VII's prohibition against racial discrimination
was primarily addressed.""' 7 That the Court's foremost concern was
furthering social policy it deemed desirable cannot be doubted in
light of the Court's reflection that
[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's con-
cern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve
the lot of those who had "been excluded from the American
dream for so long" . . . constituted the first legislative prohibi-
tion of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish
traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."8
The apparent effect of the Court's result-oriented"' interpretation of
Title VII is to permit race-dependent, preferential treatment in affir-
mative action plans whenever a job category is "traditionally segre-
gated."' 10 It appears that the Court included in its category of ''tradi-
tionally segregated" any job in which there has been a societal
history of purposeful exclusion of blacks resulting in a manifest
racial imbalance between the proportion of blacks in the labor force
and the proportion of blacks with jobs in that category."' This ex-
pansive approach to affirmative action is absolutely inconsistent
with the principle of nondiscrimination applicable to blacks and
whites alike.
The sequence of race-dependent, preferential affirmative action
that motivated Brian Weber to bring suit for reverse discrimination
evidenced a practical problem in the administration of Title VII. If
Title VII is read literally, its broad prohibition against all discrimi-
nation in employment"' clearly upholds the principle of nondiscrimi-
nation. However, before Weber, employers and unions, on the one
hand, faced liability for past discrimination against blacks and, on
the other hand, faced liability to whites for any voluntary, race-
dependent preferences adopted to lessen the effects of historic dis-
115. Id. at 2728.
116. Id. at 2725.
117. Id. at 2728.
118. Id
119. See note 62, supra.
120. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
121. See 99 S. Ct. at 2732 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 283.
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crimination against blacks. Thus, they were placed on "a high
tightrope without a net beneath them.""1 3 By abrogating the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination, the Weber Court has removed the-poten-
tial liability under Title VII of employers and unions to whites for
reverse discrimination.
The Weber Court enables the employer to redress discrimina-
tion that arose wholly outside the bounds of Title VII, which pro-
vides no remedy for pre-Act discrimination.'2 4 The Court approved a
plan designed to remedy historic discrimination that has resulted in
a "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job cate-
gories." 25 Such discrimination may have entirely predated the Act.
Moreover, the Court gauges the employer's potential for affirmative
action strictly on the basis of a statistical disparity.' Thus, the
employer need not have engaged in any acts of past discrimination.
Although a statistical disparity may support a prima facie case
against an employer, 2 ' a mere disparity previously would have been
insufficient to conclusively prove a violation of Title VII.2 8 Further-
more, in pre-Weber assessments of a prima facie case under Title
VII, the composition of the employer's work force would have been
compared to the composition of the pool of workers possessing valid
job qualifications." However, the rationale of the Weber Court is
that when historic discrimination has created "traditionally
segregated job categories,"'' the pool of qualified applicants will
reflect the results of segregation. Thus, under an expansive ap-
proach to Title VII, the Weber Court permits a comparison with the
composition of the labor force as a whole, with its higher minority
representation.
Although considerations of equity support an interpretation of
Title VII that enables private employers to voluntarily adopt affir-
mative action programs designed to uplift the status of minorities, no
form of voluntary affirmative action that violates the principle of
nondiscrimination, which is the "heart and soul of Title VII as cur-
rently written,"'2 ' can achieve truly equitable results "by permitting
employers to discriminate against some individuals to give preferen-
123. 563 F.2d at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
124. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1977).
125. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
126. Id. at 2725 & 2728 n.4.
127. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1977).
128. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20
(1977); see Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976).
129. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. at 308 & n.13; International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 33940 & n.20.
130. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
131. 99 S. Ct. at 2735 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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tial treatment to others.""'3 For the sake of responding to the
"spirit" of Title VII to reach what the present majority of the Court
deemed to be a desirable result, the Weber Court has rewritten
Title VII to overcome the prohibition against all discrimination
based on race embodied in the plain language of the statute and has
founded its decision on a legislative history in which there are no
explicit statements that warrant this radical reconstruction of Title
VII. With the Weber decision, the Court has introduced into Title
VII a tolerance for discrimination based upon race, the very evil
that Title VII's drafters sought to eradicate. Moreover, by declining
to define precisely "the line of demarcation between permissible and
impermissible affirmative action plans," '33 the Weber Court has
placed few limits on its tolerance for abrogating the principle of non-
discrimination. The Weber decision frees future courts to divine the
"spirit" of Title VII directly against its plain statutory language and
previously "uncontradicted legislative history"'34 apparently all for




133. 99 S. Ct. at 2730.
134. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. at 280.
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